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Lotterie-Paradox
Bibliografie zum Lotterie-Paradox und Vorwort-Paradox
ParadoxLiteratur und Links zu ParadoxienParadox RezensionenParadox Short Stories zur Lotterie Lotterie
Achinstein, Peter (2001): The Book of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.
Arló-Costa, Horacio (2001): "Bayesian Epistemology and Epistemic Conditionals: On the Status of the Export-Import Laws". The Journal of Philosophy 98.11, S. 555-593.
Arló-Costa, Horacio (2002): "First Order Extensions of Classical Systems of Modal Logic: The Role of the Barcan Schemas". Studia Logica 71:1, S. 87-118.
Arló-Costa, Horacio (2006): "Formal Epistemology: Some Open Topics, Background and Bibliography".
Arló-Costa, Horacio (2005): "Non-Adjunctive Inference and Classical Modalities". The Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, S. 581-605.
Arló-Costa, Horacio, Eric Pacuit (2006): "First-Order Classical Modal Logic". Studia Logica 84, S. 171-210.
Arló-Costa, Horacio, Rohit Parikh (2005): "Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference". Journal of Philosophical Logic 34, S. 97-119.
Arló-Costa, Horacio, Arthur Paul-Pedersen (2012): „Belief and probability: A general theory of probability cores”. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53:1, S. 293-315.
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Bandyopadhyay SwinburneBandyopadhyay, Prasanta S., Gordon Brittan Jr., Mark L. Taper: Belief, Evidence and Uncertainty. Problems of Epistemic Inferences. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2016. Broschiert, 178 Seiten

Lotterieparadox: Kap.2 „Bayesian and Evidential Paradims”  „Absolute and Incremental Confirmation”, S. 27-28.
Bartha, Paul (2004): "Countable Additivity and the De Finetti Lottery". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55:2. S. 301-321
Baumann, Peter (2004): "Lotteries and Contexts". Erkenntnis 61:2-3, S. 415-428.
BonJour, Laurence (1985): The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard UP.
Brendel, Elke, Christoph Jäger (2004): "Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects". Erkenntnis 61, S. 143-172.
Brown, Bryson (1999): "Adjunction and Aggregation". Nous, 33:2, 273-283.
Brown, Bryson, Peter Schotch (1999): "Logic and Aggregation". Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, S. 265-287.
Brueckner, Anthony (2000): "Klein on Closure and Skepticism". Philosophical Studies 98, S. 139-151.
Chandler, Jake (2009): "The Lottery Paradox Generalised?" – Lotterypdf
Christensen, David (2004): Putting Logic in Its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford: Oxford UP. – Christensen Rezension
Clark, Michael (2007): "The Lottery", S. 120-123; "The Preface", S. 166-168. In: Clark, Michael (2007): Paradoxes from A to Z. Second Edition. London, New York: Routledge.
Cohen, L. Jonathan (1992): An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Clarendon. cohen Rezension
Cohen, Stewart (1998): "Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:2. S. 289-306.
Cohen, Stewart (1988): "How to be a Fallibilist". Philosophical Perspectives Vol.2 Epistemology, S. 91-123.
Cohen, Stewart (2005): "Knowledge, Speaker and Subject". The Philosophical Quarterly 55:219, S. 199-212.
Collins, John (2006): "Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle". In: S. Hetherington, Hg.: Aspects of Knowing: epistemological essays. Elsevier, S. 83-96.
Comesaña, Juan (2006): "What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?" Presented at the 2006 Pacific APA, 28 Seiten – Lotteryonline (pdf)
Conee, Earl (1998): "Preface Paradox". In: Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, Hg.: A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, S. 357-359.
Cross, Troy (2007): "Comments on Vogel". Philosophical Studies 134, S. 89-98.
Derksen, A. A. (1978): "The Alleged Lottery Paradox Resolved". American Philosophical Quarterly 15.1, S. 67-74.
DeRose, Keith (1996): "Knowledge, Assertion, and Lotteries". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74:4, S. 568-580.
Dodd, Dylan (2011): „Quasi-miracles, typicality, and counterfactuals”. Synthese 179, S. 351-360.
Dodd, Dylan (2011): „Safety, Skepticism, and Lotteries”. Erkenntnis 77:1, S. 95-120.
Dodd, Dylan O. (2006): „Skepticism and the Lottery”. Diss. University of California
Douven, Igor (2002): "A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53, S. 391-410.
Douven, Igor (2003): "Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox". Philosophical Review 112:3. S. 395-404.
Douven, Igor (2003): "The Preface Paradox Revisited". Erkenntnis 59:3, S. 389-420.
Douven, Igor (2007): "A Pragmatic Dissolution of Harman's Paradox". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74:2, S. 326-345.
Douven, Igor (2007): "The Evidential Support Theory of Conditionals". Synthese 164, S. 19-44.
Douven, Igor (2008): "The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89:2, S. 204–225.
Douven, Igor, Jan-Willem Romeijn (2007): "The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox". Economics and Philosophy 23:3. S. 301-319. Lotterieonline 1 (pdf) – Lotterieonline 2 (pdf)
Douven, Igor, Timothy Williamson (2006): "Generalizing the Lottery Paradox". The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57:4, S. 755-779.
Easwaran, Kenny, Branden Fitelson (2012): „Accuracy, Coherence, and Evidence” – Vorwortonline
Engel, Mylan (1991): „Inconsistency; The Coherence Theorist’s Nemesis?” Grazer Philosophische Studien 40, S. 113-130.
Evnine, Simon J. (1999): "Believing Conjunctions". Synthese 118:2, S. 201-227.
Evnine, Simon J. (2008): Epistemic Dimensions of Personhood. New York, Oxford: Oxford UP. – Evnine Rezension
Faraci, David (2013): „Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox”. Philosophia 41, S. 751-755.
Foley, Richard (1979): "Justified Inconsistent Beliefs". American Philosophical Quarterly 16:4, S. 247-257.
Foley, Richard (1992): "The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief". American Philosophical Quarterly 29, S. 111-121.
Foley, Richard (1993): Working Without a Net. Oxford: Oxford UP. – Evnine Rezension
Foley, Richard (2009): "Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis". In: Franz Huber, C. Schmidt-Petri, Hg.: Degrees of Belief. Springer, S. 37-47.
Foley, Richard (2012): When Is True Belief Knowledge? Princeton, Oxford: Princeton UP
Foley Rezension
Frankish, Keith (2004): Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankish Rezension
Frankish, Keith (2009): "Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief". In: Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Hg.: Degrees of Belief. S. 75-93.
Fulda, Joseph S. (1994): "Implications of a Logical Paradox for Computer-Dispensed Justice". AI & Society 8:4, S. 357-359paradoxonline (pdf)
Ginet, Carl (1975): Knowledge, Perception and Memory. Philosophical Studies 5. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Haack, Susan (1978): Philosophy of Logics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP – Kapitel 8!
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Halpern HalpernHalpern, J. (2003): Reasoning about Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Taschenbuch, 497 Seiten
Hamblin, C. L. (1959): "The Modal "Probably". Mind 68:270, S. 234-240.
Hand, Michael (1996): "Surveyability and the Preface Paradox". Southwest Philosophy Review 12, S. 171-179.
Harman, Gilbert (1967): "Detachment, Probability, and Maximum Likelihood". Noûs 1:4, S. 401-411.
Harman, Gilbert (1968): "Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation". American Philosophical Quarterly 5:3, S. 164-173.
Harman, Gilbert (1973): Thought. Princeton: Princeton UP, S. 118-120, 155-161. Paradox Rezension
Harman, Gilbert (1986): Change in View. Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1986. Paradox Rezension
Hawthorne, James (1996): "On the Logic of Nonmonotonic Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities". Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, S. 185-218
Hawthorne, James (2009): "The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief". In: Franz Huber, Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Hg.: Degrees of Belief. S. 49-74.
Hawthorne, James and Luc Bovens (1992): “The Preface, the Lottery and the Logic of Belief” Mind 108, S. 241-64 suttonOnline (pdf)
Hawthorne, John (2002): "Lewis, the Lottery and the Preface". Analysis 62:3. S. 242–251.
Hawthorne, John (2004): Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Clarendon. – Paradox Rezension
Heidelberger, Herbert (1963): "Knowledge, Certainty and Probability". Inquiry 6, S. 242-250.
Hilpinen, Risto (1968): Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. Acta Philosophica Fennica. Besonders S. 39-49
Hintikka, Jaakko, Risto Hilpinen (1966): "Knowledge, Acceptance, and Inductive Logic". In: Jaakko Hintikka, Patrick Suppes, Hg.: Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland, S. 1-20.
Hintikka, Jaakko, Patrick Suppes, Hg. (1966): Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North Holland.
Hoffman, Robert (1973): "The Paradox of the Preface Again". Mind 82:327, S. 441.
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degrees DegreesHuber, Franz, Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Hg. (2009): Degrees of Belief. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Taschenbuch, 344 Seiten
Huber, Franz (2011): „Formal representations of belief”. Edward N. Zalta, Hg.: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – FormalOnline verfügbar
Hunter, Daniel (1996): "On the Relation Between Categorical and Probabilistic Belief". Noûs 30:1, S. 75-98.
Jeffrey, Richard C. (1970): "Dracula meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief". In: Marshall Swain, Hg.: Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, S. 157-185.
Jeffrey, Richard (1996): The Logic of Decision. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. [New York: McGraw-Hill 1965]
Johnson, David (2004): Truth Without Paradox. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
Paradox Rezension
Kaplan, Mark (1981): "A Bayesian Theory of Acceptance". The Journal of Philosophy 78, S. 305–30.
Kaplan, Mark (1996): Decision Theory as Philosophy. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. – Paradox Rezension
Kelly, Kevin T., Hanti Lin (2011): “A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox, with Applications to Conditional Logic”. Synthese to be printed, 45 S. – online verfügbar paradox1paradox2paradox3
Kelp, Christoph (2011): „Not Without Justification”. Dialectica 65:4, S. 581-595.
Kelp, Christoph (2014): „No Justification for Lottery Losers”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, to be printed, 13 Seiten.
Klein, Peter (1981): Certainty: a Refutation of Scepticism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. – Paradox Rezension
Klein, Peter (1985): "The Virtues of Inconsistency". The Monist 68:1, S. 105-135.
Knight, Kevin (2002): "Measuring Inconsistency". Journal of Philosophical Logic 31:1. S. 77-98.
Kroedel, Thomas (2012): „The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility”. Analysis 72:1, S. 57-60.
Kroedel, Thomas (2013): „The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn”. Logos & Episteme 4:1, S. 103-111.
Kroon, Frederick (1993): "Rationality and epistemic paradox". Synthese 94:3, S. 377-408.
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (1998): "The Epistemic Paradoxes". In: Edward Craig, Hg.: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge Press – paradoxonline verfügbar
Kyburg, Jr., Henry E. (1961): Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown: Wesleyan UP.
Kyburg, Jr., Henry E. (1963): "A Further Note on Rationality and Consistency". The Journal of Philosophy 60.16, S. 463-65.
Kyburg, Jr., Henry E. (1970): "Conjunctivitis". In: Marshall Swain, Hg.: Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, S. 55-82.
Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. (1983): Epistemology and Inference. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Kyburg Jr., Henry E. (1991): Science and Reason. USA: Oxford UP. [1990]
Kyburg, Jr. Henry E. (1997): "The Rule of Adjunction and Reasonable Inference". Journal of Philosophy 94:3, 109-125.
Kyburg, Jr. Henry E., C-M. Teng (2001): Uncertain Inference. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Paradox Rezension
Lacey, A. R. (1970): "The Paradox of the Preface". Mind 79:316, S. 614-615.
Lehrer, Keith (1975): "Reason and Consistency". In: Keith Lehrer, Hg.: Analysis and Metaphysics. Dordrecht: Reidel, S. 57-74.
Lehrer, Keith (1980): "Coherence and the Racehorse Paradox". In: P. French, Jr. Uehling, T., & H. Wettstein, Hg.: Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume V. Studies in Epistemology. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, S. 183-191.
Lehrer, Keith (1991): „Reply to Mylan Engel”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 40, S. 131-133.
Lehrer, Keith (2000): Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, Co: Westview.
Leitgeb, Hannes (2010): “Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief”
– online verfügbar: paradox 1paradox2
Leitgeb, Hannes (2012): „A New Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals”. 43 Seiten, Manuskript
Leitgeb, Hannes (2014): „The Stability Theory of Belief”. Philosophical Review 123:2, S. 131-171.
Levi, Isaac (1973): Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT. [1967]
Lewis, David (1996): "Elusive Knowledge". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, S. 549-67.
Lin, Hanti, Kevin T. Kelly (2011): „Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning”. LinOnline verfügbar
Lin, Hanti, Kevin T. Kelly (2012): “A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox, with Applications to Conditional Logic”. Synthese to be printed, 45 S.
Littlejohn, Clayton (2012): „Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions”. Logos & Episteme 3:3, S. 509-514.
Littlejohn, Clayton (2013): „Don’t Know, Don’t Believe”. Logos & Episteme 4:2, S. 231-238.
Mackie, John L. (1973): Truth, Probability, and Paradox. Oxford: Oxford UP. Kap. 6
Maher, Patrick (1993): Betting on Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
Maher, Patrick (2006): "The Concept of Inductive Probability". Erkenntnis 65:2, S. 185-206.
Maher, Patrick (2006): "A Conception of Inductive Logic". Philosophy of Science 73.5, S. 513-523.
Maher, Patrick (2006): "Book Review: David Christensen. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief". Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47:1, S. 133-149.
Makinson, David (1965): "The Paradox of the Preface". Analysis 25.6, S. 205-207.
McGlynn, Aidan (2013): „Believing Things Unknown”. Noûs 47:2, S. 385-407.
Moser, Paul K., Jeffrey Tlumac (1985): "Two Paradoxes of Rational Acceptance". Erkenntnis 23:2, S. 127-141.
Nelkin, Dana K. (2000): "The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality". Philosophical Review 109.3, S. 373-409.
Neufeld Eric, Scott Goodwin (1998): "The 6-49 Lottery Paradox". Computational Intelligence 14.3, S. 273-286.
New, Christopher (1978): "A Note on the Paradox of the Preface". Philosophical Quarterly 28:113, S. 341-344.
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Nozick NozickNozick, Robert (1981): Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taschenbuch, 784 Seiten
Nozick, Robert (1993): The Nature of Rationality. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Paradox Rezension
Olin, Doris (1989): „The Fallibility Argument for Inconsistency”. Philosophical Studies 56:1, S. 95-102.
Olin, Doris (2003): Paradox. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 2003. Paradox Rezension
Olsson, Erik J. (2005): „Meinen und Entscheiden”. In: Spohn, Wolfgang, Schroeder-Heister, Peter, & Olsson, Erik J., Hg. (2005): Logik in der Philosophie. Heidelberg: Synchron Wissenschaftsverlag der Autoren, S. 161-178.
Olsson, Erik J. (2006): „Levi and the Lottery”. In: Erik J. Olsson, Hg.: Knowledge and Inquiry. Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, S. 167-178 ?
Pollock, John P. (1986): "The Paradox of the Preface". Philosophy of Science 53.2, S. 246-58.
Pollock, John L. (1990): Nomic Probability and the Foundations of Induction. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
Pollock, John L. (1994): "Justification and Defeat". Artificial Intelligence 67:2, S. 377-408.
Poole, David (1989): „What the Lottery Paradox Tells Us About Default Reasoning”. In: Ronald J. Brachman, Hector J. Levesque, & Raymond Reiter, Hg.: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. San Mateo, Calif.: Kaufmann, S. 333-340.
Poole, David (1991): „The Effect of Knowledge on Belief: Conditioning, Specificity and the Lottery Paradox in Default Reasoning”. Artificial Intelligence 49:1-3, S. 281-307.
Priest, Graham (2005): Doubt Truth to be a Liar. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Priest, Graham (1979): "The Logic of the Paradox". Journal of Philosophical Logic 8, S. 219-41.
Prior, Arthur (1971): Objects of Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kap. 6
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Rescher RescherRescher, Nicholas (2001): Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution. Chicago, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court. Taschenbuch, 293 Seiten
Ross, Glenn (2003): „Reasonable Acceptance and the Lottery Paradox: The Case for a More Credulous Consistency”. In: Erik J. Olsson, Hg.: The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, S. 91-107.
Ross, Glenn (2012): „Reconsidering the lessons of the lottery for knowledge and belief”. Philosophical Studies, to be printed, 10 S.
Ryan, Sharon (1991): "The Preface Paradox". Philosophical Studies 64:3, S. 293-306.
Ryan, Sharon (1996): "The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency". Synthese 109:2, S.121-141.
Ryan, Sharon (1999): "The Logic of Rationality". Philosophia 27:1-2, S. 287-299.
Schick, Frederic: "Consistency and Rationality". The Journal of Philosophy 60.1 (1963). S. 5-19.
Schoeman, Ferdinand (1987): "Statistical vs. Direct Evidence". Noûs 21:2, S. 179-198.
Shaffer, Michael J. (2013): "Epistemic Paradox and the Logic of Acceptance". Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 25:3, S. 337-353
Sher, George (1980): "What Makes a Lottery Fair?" Noûs 14:2, S. 203-216.
Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa (2005): "Induction and Plausibility: A Formal Approach from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence". Diss. Université de Montréal, Montreal. SilvestreOnline
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Smith SwinburneSmith, Martin (2016): Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief. Oxford:  Oxford University Press. Gebunden, 256 Seiten
Smith, Martin (2010): “A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61:4, S. 821-831.
Sorensen, Roy (2011): “Epistemic Paradoxes”. Edward N. Zalta, Hg.: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy –  sorensenOnline
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Spohn SpohnSpohn, Wolfgang (2012): The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical Applications. Oxford: Oxford UP. Gebunden, 598 Seiten
Ranking Rezension
Stalnaker, Robert C. (1984): Inquiry. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Stein, Alex (2005): "3. Understanding the Law of Evidence through Paradoxes of Rational Belief " In: Foundations of Evidence Law. Oxford: Oxford UP, S. 64-106.
Stemmer, Nathan (1982): "A Solution to the Lottery Paradox". Synthese 51:3. S. 339-353.
Sutton, Jonathan (o.J.): "How to Mistake a Trivial Fact About Probability for a Substantive Fact About Justified Belief". suttonOnline (pdf)
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Swinburne SwinburneSwinburne, Richard (2001): Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Clarendon. Taschenbuch, 272 Seiten
Timmerman, Travis (2013): „The Persistend Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And Its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism”. Logos & Episteme 4:1, S. 85-100.
Unger, Peter (1967): "Experience and Factual Knowledge". The Journal of Philosophy 64:5, S. 152-173.
Vogel, Jonathan (1990): "Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?". In: Glenn Ross Michael D. Roth, Hg.: Doubting. Contemporary Perspectives on Skepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer, S. 217.
Vogel, Jonathan (1998): "Lottery Paradox". In: Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa, Hg.: A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell, S. 265-267.
Wallis, Charles (1998): „Subjunctive conditionals and uncertain inference”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76:4, S. 621-624.
Weatherson, Brian, James Hawthorne: "Beliefs Old and New"paradoxonline (pdf)
Wedgwood, Ralph (2012): „Justified Inference”. Synthese 189:2, S. 273-295.
Weintraub, R. (2001): "The Lottery: A Paradox Regained And Resolved". Synthese 129.3, S. 439-449.
Weisberg, Jonathan (2007): "The Preface Paradox and the Problem of Easy Knowledge". 28 Seiten – paradoxonline (pdf)
Wheeler, Gregory (2005): "On The Structure of Rational Acceptance: Comments on Hawthorne and Bovens". Synthese 144:2, S. 287-304.
Wheeler, Gregory (2005): "The Paradoxes of Rational Acceptance and the Logic of Belief". In: Lorenzo Magnani, Riccardo Dossena, Hg.: Computing, Philosophy and Cognition. London: King's College, S. 417-432.
Wheeler, Gregory (2006): "Rational Acceptance and Conjunctive/Disjunctive Absorption". Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 15:1-2, S. 49-53paradoxonline (pdf)
Wheeler, Gregory (2007): "A Review of the Lottery Paradox". In: William Harper, Gregory Wheeler, Hg.: Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr. London: King's College. S. 1-31.
Williams, John N. (1987): "The Preface Paradox Dissolved". Theoria 53, S. 121-40.
——— "Lottery paradox", paradoxWikipedia
Williamson, Timothy (1996): "Knowing and Asserting". The Philosophical Review 105:4, S. 489-523.
Williamson, Timothy (2000): Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press, USA.
Zinke, Alexandra (2013): "Lotterieparadox". In: Thomas Bonk, Hg.: Lexikon der Erkenntnistheorie. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. S. 140-144.
Short Stories zur Lotterie (belletristisch)
Jorge L. Borges (1997): "Lotterie in Babylon" [La lotería en Babilonia, 1941]. In: Lotterie in Babylon. Die schönsten Erzählungen. Berlin: Wagenbach – Text: BorgesspanischBorgesenglisch
José Antonio Burciaga (1992): "La Puerta". In: Munkelt, Marga, Hg. (2004): Mexican American Short Stories. Ditzingen: Reclam. S. 38-47 – Lotterie Rezension
Shirley Jackson (1948): "The Lottery". In: Jackson, Shirley (2005): The Lottery and Other Stories. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. S. 291-302 – Lotterie Rezension
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