29.10. 1910 London 28.6. 1989 London, englischer Philosoph
|"Again, when I say that moral judgements are emotive rather than descriptive, that they are persuasive expressions of attitudes and not statements of fact, and consequently they cannot be either true or false, ... I am not saying that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong, or that it does not matter what we do ... Finally, I am not saying that anything that anybody thinks right is right; that putting people into concentration camps is preferable to allowing them free speech if somebody happens to think so, and that the contrary is also preferable if somebody thinks that it is." Philosophical Essays. London 1963, S. 245|
|"... so long as the bounds of logical possibility are respected, it is not for the philosopher to set any limit to the marvels of nature." "The Identity of Indiscernibles", in: Philosophical Essays. London 1959. S. 27|
|Thus we offer the theist the
same comfort as we gave to the moralist. His assertions cannot possibly be
valid, but they cannot be invalid either. As he says nothing at all about the
world, he cannot justly be accused of saying anything false, or anything for
which he has insufficient grounds. It is only when the theist claims that in
asserting the existence of a transcendent god he is expressing a genuine
proposition that we are entitled to disagree with him. Language, Truth and Logic. New York 1952 . S.
The theist, like the moralist, may believe that his experiences are cognitive experiences, but, unless he can formulate his »knowledge« in propositions that are empirically verifiable, we may be sure that he is deceiving himself. It follows that those philosophers who fill their books with assertions that they intuitively »know« this or that moral or religious »truth« are merely providing material for the psycho-analyst. For no act of intuition can be said to reveal a truth about any matter of fact unless it issues in verifiable propositions. And all such propositions are to be incorporated in the system of empirical propositions which constitutes science. Language, Truth and Logic. New York 1952 . S. 120
15. Februar 1861 Ramsgate 30. Dezember 1947 Cambridge (Massachusetts); britischer Philosoph und Mathematiker Stanford Enzy Wikipedia
| Philosophy begins in
And, at the end, when philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder remains.
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